In trying to explain the drivers of global profit shifting by MNEs we investigate industry-specific variation in profit shifting and identify determinants thereof. Using the ORBIS database we show that intangible asset endowment of subsidiaries and the complexity of MNE groups explain aggregate profit shifting trends and tend to drive industry specific results. We find that subsidiaries with a high intangible to total asset ratio have a semi-elasticity of 1.2 compared to 0.78 for low intangible affiliates, suggesting a significantly larger sensitivity to CIT rate changes. Similarly, subsidiaries belonging to more complex MNE groups have a higher semi-elasticity (1.11) than those that are part of less complex entities (0.81). Moreover, we incorporate country-specific transfer pricing mitigation measures (documentation requirements) into our analysis. We find significant non-linear mitigation effects, which vary depending on the intangible endowment of subsidiaries and complexity of MNE groups. On average, the estimated profit shifting among MNE subsidiaries in our sample is reduced by 60 percent four years after the introduction of mandatory documentation requirements. The findings of our research provide initial insights on the relative profit-shifting risk associated with different sectors of MNE activities which may support the design of anti-avoidance approaches and the allocation of scarce analytical and enforcement resources. * We would like to thank
Introduction
In the context of the European sovereign debt crisis, potential tax base erosion through profit shifting by Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) has become a prominent public policy concern, making headline news and turning into a priority area for international policy coordination. 1 A growing body of evidence, comprehensively analyzed by Heckemeyer and Overesch (2012) , indicates that MNEs do indeed minimize their tax obligations by shifting profits from high to low tax jurisdictions. Studies typically show that pre-tax profitability of affiliates is decreasing in a jurisdictions tax rate or tax differential with economies hosting other firms in the same MNE group. These findings seem to hold over different periods in the last two decades and using a range of public and private information sources at the national, regional and global level (Hines and Rice, 1994; Huizinga and Laeven, 2008; Weichenrieder, 2009; Maffini and Mokkas, 2011) .
While transfer pricing needs to be analyzed looking at both managerial and tax optimization objectives, opportunities to make use of the relocation of assets or aggressive transfer (mis)pricing in the case of R&D based intangibles (Grubert, 2003) and the ease of locating intangibles in low tax subsidiary jurisdictions (Dischinger and Riedel, 2011) , the ownership structure of subsidiaries (Weichenrieder, 2009) , and the location of parent companies (Dischinger and Riedel, 2010) have been shown to impact profit shifting behavior.
Another potential driver of an MNE's profit shifting opportunities is the regulatory framework in host or parent countries. Particularly, the absence of transfer pricing regulations or lax enforcement of the arms length principle for related party transactions is likely to be associated with aggressive pricing strategies for profit shifting (Bartelsman and Beetsma, 2003; Beuselinck et al., 2009; . This paper aims to add to existing research on profit shifting behavior in two ways:
First, it investigates industry-specific variation in profit shifting and identifies determinants thereof. Using the ORBIS database and drawing on earlier approaches (Huizinga and Laeven, 2008; Dischinger and Riedel, 2010; Maffini and Mokkas, 2011) , we use a panel of approximately 16 ,000 MNE subsidiaries to analyze global profit shifting trends. We show that intangible asset endowment of subsidiaries and the complexity of MNE groups explain aggregate profit shifting trends and tend to drive industry specific results. Second, we incorporate country-specific transfer pricing mitigation measures (documentation requirements) into our analysis and find a significant, though lagged, dampening effect on 1 See OECD (2013): Base Erosion and Profit Shifting.
2 aggregate shifting behavior. These findings support and extend the observations of earlier studies, by using a global dataset and by focusing on the introduction of documentation requirements, a narrow but straightforward proxy for the enforcement of transfer pricing provisions at the national level. Moreover, we take advantage of the differentiation of profit shifting channels to show how the effectiveness of documentation rules differs across sectors.
Our analysis is relevant for the academic and public policy discourse for two related reasons. With the share of intangibles at the subsidiary level and MNE group complexity, we identify two important drivers of profit shifting behavior. In addition, the breakdown of shifting trends across industries informs the ongoing debate on the erosion of tax bases and provides additional information that may support the design of anti-avoidance approaches and the allocation of scarce analytical and enforcement resources. 2 The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the research questions and summarizes the related literature. In the following sections we present the data and empirical approach (3), and findings (4). Section 5 concludes.
Research Hypothesis and Background
In very general terms, our core hypothesis is that MNEs operating in industries and countries with more opportunities and incentives to shift profits post a lower share of earnings in their subsidiaries operating in high tax jurisdictions. To investigate this premise, we look at a range of potential industry-and country-specific determinants.
Identifying Industry Trends and Drivers
The first part of our analysis aims to uncover the determinants of profit shifting by exploiting industry characteristics. 3 In particular, we test whether the share of intangibles of affiliates and the complexity of the production process (cross-industry activities covered by an MNE group) explain variations in profit shifting.
Our emphasis on intangibles, a key source of growth and competitiveness for MNEs, is based on the insight that the valuation of trademarks, copyrights and patents for tax or 2 Similar to sector and sub-sector analysis which is commonly used to inform domestic tax administration risk assessment studies. 3 For an early approach differentiating industries see Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003) .
3 other purposes is a dauntingly difficult task. 4 Their intangible nature makes the allocation and pricing of these assets highly flexible, opening opportunities for tax minimization. The transfer of intangible ownership or licensing arrangements are thus key areas for transfer pricing valuations and disputes. It poses many practical challenges that are at the focus of ongoing coordination efforts at the international level. 5 In an early study, using data on U.S. companies, Grubert (2003) identified an association of the volume of intercompany transaction and associated profit shifting opportunities with parent R&D intensity. In addition, Karkinsky and Riedel (2009) showed that patent allocation is affected by the corporate tax rate differential across European MNEs. Importantly, Dischinger and Riedel (2011) find that the allocation of intangibles at the subsidiary level can be partly explained by tax rate differences, and that this allocation corresponds to a larger sensitivity of affiliate profitability to the tax difference. Building on these findings, we test more generally whether the relative endowment of a subsidiary with intangibles provides an opportunity driving profit-shifting activities across key industries.
Driven by increasing international specialization, the transfer pricing implications of business structures and supply-chains, which tend to include both related and third-party suppliers, have been a focus area of recent policy discussions. 6 Tax planning opportunities linked to the complexity of MNE groups are difficult to standardize. Requirements for local presence, for instance, tend to result in local income tax obligations. On the other hand, the complexity of supply-chains may in itself increase profit shifting opportunities by adding both to the number and, maybe more importantly, variability of internal crossborder transactions. The administrative costs and duration of transfer pricing audits, which require in-depth understanding of the specific economic context, are likely significantly higher in a more complex cross-sector scenario. Motivated by recently conducted policy analyses by the OECD and UN on industry value chain segmentation, 7 our paper attempts an initial assessment on the effect of MNE segmentation across industries on profit shifting.
Capturing the Enforcement of the Arm's Length Principle
Over the last two decades, governments have increasingly responded to the threat of corporate tax base erosion through transfer mispricing by introducing provisions to regulate 4 For a recent overview on intangibles and growth see Andrews and Serres (2012) . 5 OECD Revised Guidance in June 2012 http://www.oecd.org/tax/transfer-pricing/50526258.pdf 6 The OECD extended its transfer pricing guidelines regarding business restructurings in 2010. 7 OECD (2012) and UNCTAD (2013).
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transfer pricing based on the arms length principle and by strengthening the capacity of audit staff. Notably, from 1994-2011, the number of countries requiring detailed reporting of related party transactions has increased more than tenfold from 5 to more than 70 (World Bank 2013). In a first attempt to capture country specific transfer pricing legislation effects, Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003) report country response coefficients, explaining some of the differences with the strength of transfer pricing regimes. The authors account for the existence of transfer pricing provisions, documentation guidelines and specific penalties linked to transfer pricing. However, limited variation among the observed countries' enforcement practices in their panel limits the usefulness of these initial findings. Beuselinck et al. (2009) follow a similar intuition, using a binary score for a range of transfer pricing regulations, including documentation requirements. More recently Lohse and Riedel (2012) used a more sophisticated scoring system which is presented in and captures the existence of transfer pricing regulation, including the extend of documentation obligations in the legislation. Similar to these earlier efforts we assess the effect of regulatory measures on profit shifting activities. As opposed to creating an index of the strength of transfer pricing regimes, we solely focus on the introduction of mandatory transfer pricing documentation requirements. We chose this narrow approach as a proper assessment of transfer pricing risks -guiding enforcement efforts -initially requires filling information gaps on transactions with associated parties. The introduction of documentation requirements is therefore commonly assumed to have a strong signaling and compliance effect on multinationals and can be interpreted as a proxy for actual administrative enforcement of the arms length principle. In line with this observation, we assume that the introduction of an obligation to prepare detailed information on internal transactions and to document a company's transfer pricing policy, significantly reduces profit shifting through mispricing. Additionally, we expect the effect of these requirements to differ (i) over time given that tax administrations take time to build up capacity in using the information they obtain through mandatory documentation and (ii.) for sectors, given that tax administrations may initially focus on simple targets such as distributor margins or management fees and industries with more complexity and opportunities may be less deterred by documentation requirements. Table 1 depicts our sample selection. We select all parents owning a foreign subsidiary with at least 50% of its shares, which amounts to around 42,048 immediate parents owning 138,115 subsidiaries (domestic and foreign). Our analysis is focused on subsidiaries only. Approximately 5000 of the companies in the subsidiary sample are also parents. We eliminate these from our sample but add them again as part of our robustness checks. We limit our sample to observations in OECD member states, though this still includes global information on the tax differences for each MNE group. Moreover, our analysis requires basic accounting information for all MNE groups, meaning that all basic variables need to be available for at least 3 years, profitability of subsidiaries in a given year, and sufficient country and industry coverage. This selection criterion reduces our sample by more than 60 percent, possibly resulting in a bias as incomplete accounting information may be correlated to less transparent corporate governance and more aggressive tax optimization. 9 8 See OECD 2010 for a comprehensive summary. 9 Such a bias would likely result in an underestimation of findings on aggregate profit shifting. Step 3 -remove parents that are also part of the subsidiary sample.
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Step 4 -three years information on EBIT, cost of employees and fixed assets available.
Step 5 -minimum of 90% ownership in the chain from parent to affiliate.
Step 6 -exclude affiliates having zero cost of employees, negative fixed, total, or intangible assets.
Step 7 -exclude observations where EBIT, cost of employees or fixed assets are negative.
Step 9 -exclude countries and industries having ≤ 10 affiliates.
Industry Classification
We rely on the European Classification of Economic Activities (NACE) for the ordering of MNEs across sectors. The starting point for our classification of an MNE groups industry is the industry assignment of each affiliate provided in the ORBIS database. Generally, we aggregate industries at the first level of the alphabetical NACE codes. For sectors, such as manufacturing, where our sample includes more than 1000 MNEs at the first level, we also differentiate activities at the second and/or third level in the NACE hierarchy. Moreover, we group all affiliates designated as holding, head office activity, trust, funds and similar financial entities 10 together in a single holding category and discard those industries with less than 10 multinationals in our sectoral analysis. For all affiliates across our sample we differentiate a total of 40 industries (see Annex 2). A simple descriptive analysis of our data presented in Figure 1 below, reveals noticeable differences in both intangible endowments of affiliates across different sectors as well as a major variance in the complexity of the MNE groups these affiliates belong to.
10 This category may include internal financing companies. 
Intangible to Total Assets (%)
The axis labeled Complexity depicts the logarithm of the number of different 2-digit NACE codes within a MNE group. The axis labeled Intangible to Total Assets depicts the ratio of intangible to total assets in percent. Thick lines depict median.
Documentation Requirements
Our information on the introduction of documentation rules is taken from several sources, 
Estimation Approach
Our basic estimation approach is summarized by
Our main measure of reported profits π is Earnings Before Interest and Taxes (EBIT), thus excluding intercompany financing decisions. 11 The variable CitDif specifies the differential of the statutory Corporate Income Tax (CIT) rate between the subsidiary and the rest of the MNE group. This variable is the main indicator of profit shifting behavior and its coefficient is expected to take a negative value. A vector of control variables is depicted by X it , including the main input factors such as fixed assets, cost of employees, the MNE's aggregate assets, and country factors such as GDP, GDP per capita, the unemployment rate, and corruption based on the World Bank control of corruption index. Finally, we include industry year effects (ρ t ), and firm specific fixed effects (ν i ).
In subsequent specifications, we introduce affiliate and MNE specific variables. A variable denoted IntTotAs, depicts the ratio of intangibles to total assets held by a subsidiary. We obtain information on intangibles from the ORBIS database, which collects this information from publicly available sources. The value of intangibles in our sample could thus be affected by differences in the underlying country-specific accounting standards; particularly in Austria, Denmark and Germany, where self-created intangibles are not recognized on the balance sheet. 12 Another variable, denoted COMPLEX, categorizes the number of sectors covered by each MNE group (taking the 2nd level of the NACE classification as a reference). Both variables are interacted with the tax differential in order to assess their effect on tax driven profitability. We expect both to increase profit shifting tendencies.
In addition, we introduce DOC, a variable representing the number years since mandatory documentation requirements have been introduced. We only capture situations where the lack of documentation has an effect on penalties, i.e. when multinational affiliates or parents are penalized for not preparing comprehensive documentation, or where the preparation of documentation helps shield taxpayers from penalties or reduces their amount (as is the case for instance in Australia, the U.K., and Italy). This classification follows the assumption that documentation disclosure requirements and a link of documentation preparation to the penalty regime provide a strong incentive, likely changing taxpayer behavior. To take account of the incentive for tax administrations to protect their domestic tax base, we only capture documentation rules for subsidiaries where a risk of outward shifting exists, i.e. the variable takes the value zero when the tax differential is negative.
We model the impact of documentation requirements with a quadratic time trend starting with the year of introduction of these provisions in order to allow for the expected non-linear effect.
Empirical Results

Aggregate findings
Our results are depicted in Tables 2 and 3 below. The first specification in as well as the aggregate assets held by the whole MNE group are explaining changes in EBIT across our sample.
In specification 2 and 3 we display our findings on the drivers of profit shifting. The second column presents the effect of the ratio of intangibles over total assets held by a subsidiary. The interaction term is negative with a magnitude of 3.34 and significant at the five percent level. This finding indicates a higher semi-elasticity of profits derived from intangibles at the subsidiary level. The coefficient of IntTotAs is highly significant and negative. This is due to the variable being defined as a ratio, with total assets in the denominator capturing effects of the capital stock.
In the third specification we try to approach supply-chain complexity by constructing a variable on the industry coverage within the MNE group. The main assumption being that the more complex an MNE structure is, the more opportunities there are to take advantage of profit shifting strategies. This measure is obviously strongly correlated to firm size, but by including total aggregate MNE group assets into our specifications we isolate the effect of complexity. Being negative with a magnitude of 0.09, our coefficient depicts a significant effect of MNE complexity, partly explaining profit-shifting tendencies. , * * and * * * indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. First three columns estimate specification for the full sample. Columns 4 − 7 reestimate specification of column 1 for subsamples being characterised by above (below) median intangible to total assets ratio (Column 4 and 5) and by above (below) median number of different 2-digit NACE codes within the MNE (Column 6 and 7). MNEA are aggregate assets of the multinational group minus fixed assets of subsidiary.
Columns 4, 5, 6 and 7 depict a re-estimation of specification 1 for different sub-samples.
We divide the sample at the median for both high and low intangible subsidiaries as well as for subsidiaries that are part of complex and simple MNE group structures. The results are consistent with our findings, with higher significance levels and magnitudes for the subsets of high intangible and complex subsidiaries. Overall, these findings suggest that there are indeed significant differences in profit shifting behavior, depending on the complexity of MNE groups and the ratio of intangibles of each subsidiary.
Mitigation Results
Table 3 below summarizes our findings on the effect of documentation rules. The first specification re-estimates the sensitivity of EBIT to CIT changes. The second specification introduces an interaction of the tax difference with the variable capturing the existence of documentation rules. Taking the non-monotonicity of its effects into account, we find that the introduction of documentation rules has initially a negative, but not significant, effect on subsidiary profitability. This result may be partly explained by the additional costs stemming from the need to prepare detailed documentation. 13 The second-order term, however, is positive and statistically significant with a p-value of 0.003. This indicates that documentation rules become effective in mitigating profit shifting with a time lag.
Figure 3 illustrates these findings. A little more than two years after their introduction, we observe that documentation starts reducing overall profit shifting in the economies in our sample. The semi-elasticity of subsidiary EBIT is reduced by 0.64 within 4 years following enforcement through documentation rules, translating into mitigation of about 60 percent of the observed profit shifting among MNE subsidiaries in our sample. These aggregate findings support our assumption that the learning curve of tax administrations using additional information at their disposal does indeed translate into more substantial mitigation over time.
The following specifications differentiate our findings for subsidiaries with high and low intangible ratios as well as for those affiliates part of more complex and simple MNE group structures. In line with our predictions, we find significant variation. No significant effect of documentation on subsidiaries with a high intangible to total asset ratio can be observed, whereas mitigation can be observed among low intangible affiliates, who are, however, less 13 Documentation is usually either done locally or by a centralized transfer pricing unit, resulting in significant costs. Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * , * * and * * * indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. First two columns estimate specification for the full sample. Columns 4 − 6 reestimate specification of column 2 for subsamples being characterised by above (below) median intangible to total assets ratio (Column 3 and 4) and by above (below) median number of different 2-digit NACE codes within the MNE (Column 5 and 6). The variable counting years since introduction of documentation requirements (DOC) is centred around its mean (zDOC), in order to reduce correlation with its square. MNEA are aggregate assets of the multinational group minus fixed assets of subsidiary.
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14 likely to shift profits in the first place (see Fig. 3 for a graphical illustration). In the case of our complexity variable, the opposite is true. A significant mitigation effect can be observed among affiliates of more complex MNE groups; illustrating that firm complexity poses less of a challenge to effective domestic enforcement than the appropriate pricing of intangible assets. 
Years since Introduction of Documentation Requirements
Semi-Elasticity of EBIT w.r.t. CitDif
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Overall
High
Low
Lines depict estimated elasticity of EBIT with respect to the tax differential CitDif as a (quadratic) function of time since introduction of documentation requirements. Solid line gives estimation results based on the whole sample. Grey lines depict 95% confidence interval of the linear combination based on a robust covariance matrix estimation for the whole sample. Dashed (dotted) line depicts estimation results for the subsample of affiliates with a intangible to total assets ratio above (below) median.
Industry Results
The simple descriptive analysis presented earlier (Fig. 1 ) already revealed noticeable differences in both intangible endowments of affiliates across different sectors as well as a major variation in the complexity of the MNE groups these affiliates belong to. Consequently, we expect major differences in actual profit shifting behavior across these sectors. Table   4 illustrates that this is indeed the case. Using the same general set-up of the estimation strategy discussed above it provides estimates of profit shifting disaggregated by 40 industry categories. Dividing our sample, we estimate profit shifting for each sector separately.
The columns labeled Estimate in Table 4 present these sector-specific results.
Our results broadly follow the predictions that can be made based on the descriptive depiction in Fig. 1 . Sectors with a significant and negative coefficient of the tax differential include Health, Petroleum production, Administrative as well as Other services; all above the median for both the share of intangibles to total assets and the complexity of their MNE group structure. Notably, and differing from most other sectors in our sample, 14 the result for the mining sector is highly sensitive to the inclusion of our corruption variable.
The negative coefficient for the sector becomes significant once we drop our control for corruption. Data services and retail subsidiaries are among the group with the highest intangible ratio whereas real estate subsidiaries tend to be part of highly complex MNEs, though they have a low intangible to total asset ratio. Management subsidiaries are close to the median for intangibles and above the complexity median. Of the sectors with a significant negative profit-shifting coefficient only transportation and household wholesale are below both the median for complexity and the intangible ratio. We find no statistically significant trends for holding subsidiaries, manufacturers in the pharmaceutical sector and publishing affiliates despite a high intangible ratio in these sectors. These findings could be driven by a range of sector-specific factors, in particular the role of preferential tax treatment accorded to several industries, which limit the importance of statutory income tax rates and thus undermine their predictive power. Holding subsidiaries, for instance, typically function as a conduit for various payments (dividends, interest and royalties).
Countries in our sample with favorable holding regimes such as the Netherlands or Luxembourg thus derive their attractiveness from extensive treaty networks and the limitation or absence of withholding taxes on dividends, interest and royalties. In the Netherlands, for instance, foreign profits can be repatriated into a Dutch holding subsidiary with an exemption from income taxation. The allocation of profits towards holding subsidiaries in jurisdictions with high Corporate Income Tax rates is thus likely the result of very low effective rates in these jurisdictions. Consequently, our analysis, based on differences of the statutory corporate income tax rate, falls short when looking at holding company arrangements. Similarly, preferential tax treatment accorded to entertainment MNE activities in high tax jurisdictions, resulting in low effective tax rates, may explain the counterintuitive result of a significant and positive effect of the tax differential for this sector.
Conclusion
In trying to explain the drivers of global profit shifting by MNEs, we analyzed the role of intangible assets and the complexity of MNE group structures. Our panel regression based on company information provided in the global ORBIS dataset provides evidence that both variables are indeed significant determinants of profit shifting activities. We find that subsidiaries with a high intangible to total asset ratio have a semi-elasticity of 1.2 compared to 0.78 for low intangible affiliates, suggesting a significantly larger sensitivity to CIT rate changes. Similarly, subsidiaries belonging to more complex MNE groups have a higher semi-elasticity (1.11) than those that are part of less complex entities (0.81).
Further differentiation for 40 industries confirmed important differences in the magnitude of shifting behavior across sectors, largely following our predictions. Additionally, our findings on the documentation rules support and extend the observations of earlier studies highlighting the importance of domestic enforcement efforts. Focusing on the introduction of documentation requirements, a narrow but straightforward proxy for the enforcement of transfer pricing provisions at the national level, we find significant non-linear mitigation effects. On average, the estimated profit shifting among MNE subsidiaries in our sample is reduced by 60 percent four years after the introduction of mandatory documentation requirements. Our findings suggest, however, that documentation rules do not help address profit shifting risks of intangible intensive subsidiaries. Taking the perspective of host country tax administrations, the findings of our research provide initial insights on the relative profit-shifting risk associated with different sectors of MNE activities. The first and second column present the number of observations and number of affiliates, respectively. Industry means of the accounting variables EBIT, cost of employees, fixed assets, intangible assets, the ratio of intangible to total assets is presented in the following columns. The column labeled Comp. depicts the number of different nace sectors that is observed on average across the MNE group. Doc gives percentage of observations over years [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] , where documentation was required. T ax presents mean tax rate over this period. The first and second column present the number of observations and number of affiliates, respectively. Country means of the accounting variables EBIT, cost of employees, fixed assets, intangible assets, the ratio of intangible to total assets is presented in the following columns. The column labeled Comp. depicts the number of different nace sectors that is observed on average across the MNE group. Doc gives percentage of observations over years [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] , where documentation was required. T ax presents mean tax rate over this period. 
